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Non-technical summary
This article offers a first broad-brushed study of central bank communication on fiscal policy. It provides some quantitative insights on how often central bank officials openly communicate on fiscal matters, and how this has developed over time. Our approach combines both a qualitative analysis and a more quantitative-type analysis, based on an indicator specifically built to measure the intensity of central bank communication on fiscal issues. Fiscal communication by central banks is shown to be related to fiscal developments such as changes in government deficit or debt.
Fiscal policy directly affects the economic environment in which central banks operate, and in particular the outlook for inflation and growth. In the short-term, automatic fiscal stabilisers tend to dampen business cycle volatility, while discretionary fiscal policy impacts prices and output mainly through its effect on aggregate demand. Prices are also affected by indirect tax changes. In the long-term, expansionary fiscal policy may erode the sustainability of public debt and raise inflation expectations, while structural policies using fiscal instruments can foster potential growth if spending notably improves overall productivity of the factors of production.
Against this backdrop, central bankers typically refer -albeit through different channels and in different
shapes -to fiscal policy in their public communication for essentially two reasons: first, fiscal policy is one of the key elements contributing to the shaping of monetary policy decisions, which then themselves require explanation to the general public; second, central banks may sometimes find it appropriate to present their views on the desirable forward-looking direction of fiscal policy, typically in an attempt to convey to responsible authorities an assessment about what is required to ensure the longer-term sustainability of public finances. Of course, the specific features of each country/union of countries greatly matter.
To measure the intensity of central banks' fiscal communication, a synthetic quarterly indicator was constructed for the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, and the Swedish Riksbank, over a 12 year period starting from 1999 to 2011. The indicator reflects the intensity -in terms of size -of external communication on fiscal policy developments, based on the main official monetary policy publication that includes information on the monetary policy deliberations (minutes of the decision-making bodies or introductory statements at press conferences). All statements on fiscal policy were classified according to six categories: 1) "Positive" statements on domestic fiscal policy as an element taken into account by the central bank when assessing the monetary policy stance, 2) Normative statements calling on the government(s) in the bank's jurisdiction to take some defined action, 3) References to fiscal policy as an input to or outcome of central bank forecasts, "Central banks are often accused of being obsessed with inflation. This is untrue. If they are obsessed with anything, it is with fiscal policy." (M. King, 1995) 
Introduction
A perhaps not much advertised side-effect of the financial crisis is that central bankers increasingly -and more publicly -communicate on fiscal policy developments and perspectives. Such communication, which may occur for a variety of reasons, takes place amidst the acknowledged importance for central bankers to be clearer and more transparent about their policy decisions and underpinning analysis. Our findings indicate that the Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank devote about 2 to 4% of their main monetary policy communication outlet to fiscal issues, mostly describing recent fiscal developments and outlook. On average the ECB devotes around 12% of its introductory statements to fiscal issues, and for the larger part ECB's communication on fiscal policy is of a normative nature. Cross-country comparability of our findings is warranted only to a very limited extent because of structural differences in the institutional frameworks and traditions of central banks.
Government deficits are identified as a main driver of the intensity of fiscal communication in the US, the euro area and Japan. Since the onset of the financial crisis, developments in public finances have also become a driver of fiscal communication also for the Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the main channels through which fiscal policy affects the short to longer-term environment for monetary policy. Section 3 recalls the importance of central banks' external communication. Section 4 sketches out our developed indicator for central bank communication on fiscal policy and carries out an empirical analysis of its intensity over the period 1999-2011. Concluding remarks are offered in section 5.
1 Monetary policy aspects of central bank communication are extensively dealt with in the overview article by Blinder et al. (2008) . Financial stability issues are analysed in Geraats (2010) , exchange rate aspects in Fratzscher (2008) and money market aspects in Neuenkirch (2012) . 2 To our best knowledge, Moser-Boehm (2006 and Rozkrut (2008) are the only studies dealing with fiscal policy communication.
Fiscal policy effects on the economy and prices
Fiscal policy is one among the main factors determining the macroeconomic environment in which a central bank operates. There are three main channels through which fiscal policy affects the short-term environment for monetary policy: automatic fiscal stabilisers, discretionary fiscal measures and, among the latter, measures having a direct price-impact (e.g. value-added or sales tax rates). Taking a longerterm view, fiscal policies matter to central banks mainly because of their implications for the more general sustainability of public finances and their effects on potential economic growth.
3
Automatic fiscal stabilisers are the first channel through which fiscal policy can affect the economy, and thereby the monetary policy setting. Automatic stabilisers by their very nature contribute to lower amplitudes of business cycles and less volatility in prices. Automatic stabilisation may arise from the responses of tax systems to income changes (e.g. progressive tax) and spending changes (notably unemployment benefits), but also from a more or less rules-based system of government spending reactions to economic developments, as in the US.
As regards discretionary measures, standard macroeconomic analysis suggests that expansionary fiscal measures have a positive effect on growth and price developments in the short-term. The resulting sign and size of fiscal multipliers vary depending on a range of factors including the composition of budget changes, product and labour market flexibility, and reactions in foreign exchange and bond markets (for a survey of fiscal multipliers in the literature, see Spilimbergo, Symansky and Schindler (2009) ).
Some discretionary measures have a direct impact on price developments. Changes in indirect tax rates, such as value-added, sales, tobacco or energy taxes, feed into prices. Governments also set administered prices and provide subsidies, especially in areas with a public service character (for instance healthcare).
Government wage agreements can also affect the price level, not only through their impact on aggregate demand, but also through a leading role for private wage negotiators. Our focus is the main official monetary policy publication by central banks that includes information on the monetary policy deliberations. These may take the shape of minutes of decision-making body meetings or introductory statements released on behalf of the decision-making body. These central bank Jonas and Mishkin (2005) report that the central bank of Poland possibly kept interest rates high to exert pressure on the government to tighten fiscal policy. 7 When it comes to 'general aspects of fiscal policy', 50% of the central banks comment often/always, 30% comment at times, and 20% comment rarely. As to reasons for commenting, 50% refer to 'tradition' rather than to 'formal rules', 'personal preferences' or 'other reasons'. statements reflect the discussion on monetary policy, being the core activity of central banks, therefore receiving much public attention.
8 Inclusion of fiscal statements in such releases indicates best the role of fiscal developments in monetary policy decision-making and communication. The structure and contents of these main policy publications differ widely among central banks (see Jeanneau, 2009 ). For most central banks, minutes of the decision-making body are seen as the most informative publication.
However, for the ECB this is the introductory statement at the press conference just after the meeting of its Governing Council. Some differences might exist between the nature of minutes, reflecting the internal deliberations and viewpoints, and introductory statements, focusing on explaining the rationale underlying monetary policy decisions, reflecting a collegial communication strategy (see Blinder et al. 2008) . However, there is a large variety in approaches in central bank minutes, from rather global summaries of the elements discussed to detailed reports of each member's remarks. Given this fundamental diversity in central bank communication, our analysis focusses on the time-series dimension.
Cross-country comparability of communication intensity is not warranted, because of structural differences in the institutional frameworks and traditions of central banks. Heuristic approaches have been applied, where the researcher qualifies central bank statements according to some guidelines, but based on his/her own interpretation. As an example, Rozkrut (2008) analyses the communication of the National Bank of Poland by assessing selected texts on four dimensions using judgement, assigning a binary value for each dimension; "criticizing fiscal situation" (value +1) or "favouring fiscal situation"(value-1). Relying on human subjectivity is time consuming but it makes it possible to adapt the indicator to the exact goal one wants to achieve. It makes it possible to detect some situations that a machine could not detect, thus reducing the probability of unduly attributing part of the text to communication on fiscal policy. Alternatively, fully automated approaches have the benefit of being objective, quick and replicable but they require text structures to remain fairly comparable over time. For instance, Lucca and Trebbi (2009) use such an automated approach to assess the Fed's Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC) statements on the hawkish -dovish axis.
9
For the purposes of constructing our fiscal communication indicator, a mix of predefined guidelines and discretionary assessment (supported by a glossary of "word codes") was used, in line with earlier work by Rosa and Verga (2006) who analysed ECB communication on monetary policy using keywords, and assessed the most relevant words on the hawkish-dovish axis. However, the authors underline in their paper the need for human appraisal. The KOF "Monetary Policy Communicator for the Euro Area" is another example in this category (KOF Swiss Economic Institute, 2007) . While a fully automated approach would have the advantage of a low degree of subjectivity and a high level of consistency, we nevertheless deemed some room for discretionary assessment inevitable for increasing reliability. For instance, minutes of the Bank of Japan sometimes include statements made by government representatives within the decision-making body, which should not be confused with central bank communication.
10
Based on a limited number of introductory statements/minutes, we set up a framework for automatically detecting relevant fiscal words, which were then discretionarily assessed for appropriate categorisation. Statements from government representative (category 6) are part of the minutes in the case of the Bank of Japan, and were identified separately and excluded from the empirical analysis below. They do not necessarily reflect a view of the monetary committee or one of its members when making monetary policy decisions.
"Fiscal" sentences were detected using the search function, corrected where deemed appropriate. For instance, the terms "after-tax income" or "fiscal year" are not directly related to fiscal issues. On the other hand, some sentences may contain references to fiscal policy even though they do not explicitly include fiscal keywords (e.g. when referring to 'it', being fiscal policy mentioned in a previous sentence). As a result, it was important to read the sentences detected by the "search" function as well as a few sentences before and after each of the detected sentences. All selected sentences were allocated to one and only one category. This proved to be particularly demanding for the categories referring to the monetary policy stance (category 1) and for the normative assessment (category 2). Pre-set priority rules were used when fiscal policy references could fit more than one category (see annex II for further details).
Subsequently, the number of words in each category and for each month was counted. Outcomes were normalised to account for the overall size of the minutes/introductory statements and its evolution over time, by dividing word counts by the total number of words contained in the relevant minutes/ introductory statements. Quarterly averages were taken to smooth out high volatility in monthly data.
11 Table 2 summarises some relevant statistics of the series used in the econometrical part of the paper for the relevant period (generally 1999Q1-2011Q4).
Empirical analysis
A global analysis of developments of the indicator and of main fiscal developments may already hint at some relationship between the size of fiscal communication and factors motivating them. The period covered is 1999Q1 to 2011Q4. The dependent variable is defined as the number of words in 'fiscal' sentences over the total number of words in the minutes/introductory statements. An autoregressive approach was chosen to take into account any persistence in fiscal communication.
The change in the budget balance ratio and the change in the debt ratio are included to summarise public finances. 13 The level of the budget balance is not included as it is closely correlated with the change in the debt ratio. The level of the debt-to-GDP ratio is not included, because it is clearly non-stationary over the period 1999-2011. Ideally, real-time forecasts of public debt and budget balances would be included to mimic the information-set available to central banks when discussing monetary policy but deriving such dataset over the entire period turned out to be very difficult, especially for the earlier years of the sample with many breaks in definitions. In addition, publicly available forecasts are not necessarily in line with internal projections or assessments prepared by central banks as inputs to the deliberations of their decision-making bodies. We have therefore not pursued this avenue further.
To test for effects of the crisis, a dummy was included taking value 1 as of 2008Q4, i.e., after Lehman's default. This dummy appears as a separate variable in the estimation-equation but also in interaction with the budgetary variables to detect any change in the importance given by central banks to developments in public finance. Various control variables were included capturing non-fiscal developments that could require more attention in minutes/introductory statements, and therefore reduce the relative space devoted to fiscal developments.

Output gaps: Output gaps are included to capture any cyclical elements. Assuming central banks worry equally about under-and overutilization, the absolute value of the output gap was taken. A negative sign can be expected as large output gaps (positive or negative) are a concern to central banks, limiting the relative space they devote to fiscal topics.  Inflation: High inflation could lead a central bank to pay more attention to price developments, and therefore less to fiscal developments (unless inflation rises due to fiscal measures). We considered both the increase per se as well as the change in the deviation from 2%, being an 12 In addition, the tone of the statements on fiscal policy could change with deteriorating fiscal developments, using the same number of words, but our analysis does not take that into account. 13 Unless indicated differently, changes refer to the contemporaneous value of a variable compared to its value 4 quarters ago. Estimations were performed in OLS using a 'general-to-specific' approach, and the 10% significance level as cut-off. The results support the notion that the state of public finances plays a role in setting the length of the fiscal part of central bank minutes or introductory statements. In particular, a worsening fiscal stance, as captured by a decrease in the budget balance, increases the space devoted to fiscal statements for the three main central banks, especially for the ECB. 15 The effect ranges between a 1.6 percentage-point increase in the share of the introductory statement devoted to fiscal issues after a 1 percentage-point of GDP deterioration of the budget balance for the ECB, to less than half  Finally, the test on seasonality, which could for instance reflect recurrent annual fiscal statements, does not deliver satisfactory results for any of the central banks considered. 16 Leads of variables have been extensively tested, to reflect the idea that central banks react to projected developments rather than current ones, but results did not outperform the ones shown in table 3.
Several tests were undertaken to check the robustness of the results. For one, the same equations were run using the absolute number of fiscal words in central bank minutes/introductory statements rather than as percentage of the total number of words. Results are shown in table 4. may also be ground for more communication on fiscal matters, flagging central bank's interpretation of the fiscal rules and urging fiscal policy-makers to live up to them. 16 This may reflect the fact that the day of announcement of the budget varies from year to year. The new budget therefore may be discussed in different monetary policy meetings.
The role of fiscal variables is confirmed with the exception of the change in the government deficit in Fed's communication, which now turns insignificant. The deficit-effect on fiscal communication in absolute terms is significant at the ECB and the BoJ. The effect at the BoJ being larger than that of the ECB reflects the much larger size of the BoJ minutes (close to 6300 words on average) compared to the number of words in an average ECB introductory statement (around 1500). The only other change from significance to insignificance is for the role of the output gap in the estimation for the Riksbank.
In general, t-statistics and R 2 suggest that our baseline specification, with fiscal communication expressed as a ratio of the total number of words in the minutes/introductory statements somewhat better fits our data than a specification in levels. Ratios seem to better reflect the concept of an intensity of fiscal 18 This was also confirmed by the CUSOM of squared test on the equations in table 3, which revealed stability of the coefficients within a 5% confidence interval for all estimates except for the Fed estimate for 2011Q2. This may indicate that the start of the sovereign debt crisis in that quarter was more relevant for the Fed than the start of the financial crisis. Given a limited number of observations for the period of the sovereign debt crisis, we kept the start of the crisis dummy in 2008Q4. 0.36*** (3 central bank actions; only in the case of normative statements can it be expected that there is some intention to affect fiscal policy. Studying such effect empirically, however, is fraught with difficulties, including capturing (many) other factors having an impact on fiscal policy, and the fact that governments may try to affect monetary policy, giving rise to dynamic interactions. We do not pursue this avenue further here therefore. 
Conclusion
This paper attempts to shed some light on the role of fiscal policy in central bank communication, a topic that thus far has received very little attention in economic research. Questions included are: how much central banks openly communicate on fiscal policy, on which aspects do their fiscal communications focus and has this changed with the financial crisis. To this purpose, we developed a fiscal communication indicator for five central banks based on their main official monetary policy publication that includes information on the monetary policy deliberations, using a combination of both objective guidelines and more subjective assessment.
Our analysis indicates that, compared to the overall length of the minutes/introductory statements, the ECB communicates intensively on fiscal policy, and especially on normative aspects. The other central banks tend to be largely descriptive when referring to domestic and foreign fiscal policy developments and perspectives. Empirically analysing developments in fiscal communication between 1999 and 2011, we find some evidence that the part devoted to fiscal developments increases in case of higher government deficits in the US, the euro area and Japan, while in the UK and Sweden such effects are visible as of the start of the financial crisis for the debt and deficit ratio respectively. These results are fairly robust to alternative specifications such as using the absolute number of words devoted to fiscal policy rather than its share in the total number of words used in the main monetary policy communication device.
This study is -to our knowledge -the first one to quantify fiscal statements of central banks. The Monthly Bulletin provides the general public and financial markets with a detailed and comprehensive analysis of the euro area economic environment, in which past as well as expected fiscal policy developments are presented and assessed in each issue's Editorial. On a quarterly basis, the commentary section of the Monthly Bulletin also includes a more detailed fiscal policy section, notably in connection with the main regular pieces of fiscal "news" that can be used for euro area wide (or consistent cross-country) analysis. Additional boxes on topical public finance issues are also frequently included. Apart from the monthly editorials and quarterly sections, the Monthly Bulletin also contains longer articles providing additional insights on both technical and more policy-oriented fiscal policy aspects. Staff fiscal projections are not published. Main government finance statistics for the euro area (deficit/debt, revenue and expenditure developments; both annual and on quarterly basis) are presented under the euro area statistics section (6) An inspection of these reports reveals only very marginal references to fiscal issues, notably in as much as projected developments of particular fiscal variables may contribute to affect the broader outlook for economic activity and prices. References are for example: "Developments in fiscal reform, such as reductions both in public investment, generally a powerful stimulant for the labour-intensive nonmanufacturing sector, and in the salaries of local government employees, are also acting to constrain households' income. This situation is expected to continue for some time" (OEAP, May 2007 p. 18); ''Meanwhile, public investment was basically on a downtrend'' (AR 2006, p.40) . The Governor and other executives appear before parliament committees, when requested and to answer questions regarding the conduct of the Bank's policies and operations. Available English documentation of these Testimonies and other Board Members' speeches do not however point to prominent fiscal references.
The Bank of Japan releases the financial assets and liabilities of the government sector in its flow of funds updates. Main public finance statistics (general government revenues and expenditures) are also reported in the "Financial and Economic Statistics Monthly", available online. Thus, the Bank of Japan appears to be not particularly active in fiscal communication. However, it should be once again noted that a detailed search was hindered by the lack of fully-fledged (website-based) information. Typically, only short English summaries of documents/speeches are provided.
Bank of England
The main channel for external communication is the speeches by the Governor and members of the Monetary Policy Committee. References to fiscal policy developments are also made in regular publications like the Inflation Report, but these are typically only factual in nature. The Governor and other executives appear before parliament committees, before which they may be requested to answer questions regarding the conduct of the Bank's policies and operations. On such occasion they may be prompted to address fiscal policy issues/developments. All in all, also the Bank of England appears to be the very little active in fiscal communication, consistent with its pre-2000 communication policy, i.e. from the period previous to which the Bank was granted operational independence.
Swedish Riksbank
The The Riksbank also produces forecasts for fiscal policy. Fiscal policy is assumed to follow historical patterns and to act through automatic stabilisers as well as discretionary countercyclical policy. It is assumed that the target for public finances (a surplus of 1 per cent of GDP on average over an economic cycle) will be achieved in the long term. Different fiscal policy measures have, however, different effects on demand, supply and inflation (from the Monetary Policy Report 2008:3). All in all, also the Riksbank's external fiscal communication policy appears to be very limited in both its scope and nature. This may largely be the resultant of the rules-based fiscal framework adhered to by the government, which has led the debt ratio on a downward trajectory since 1996.
2) "As regards fiscal policy, the Governing Council notes with concern the pressures emerging in a number of countries to relax previous fiscal consolidation targets. In the current overall benign economic environment, it is imperative that all governments comply with the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact on fiscal consolidation in economic "good times" and that all the countries concerned honour the commitments they made at the Next, the process of finding, classifying and delimiting the statements on fiscal policy was manual. References were detected via a classical "search" Word function, based on the keywords: "fiscal", "tax", "government", "deficit", and "public". 22 Containing one of these words is not a sufficient condition to be included: the expression "after tax income" for instance appeared many times but was not always related to fiscal issues and therefore ignored. Moreover, some sentences contained references to fiscal policy even when they did not contain any of the previous keywords. Reading the sentences before and after the sentence in which the keyword was detected revealed that frequently several sentences in a paragraph were dedicated to fiscal issues whereas only some of them contain one of the keywords. While the process therefore is governed by many 'objective' rules, there remain areas where subjective elements play a role. The remaining assessment was taken care of by two readers who brought forward 'grey areas' for common decision and understanding. The analysis only took complete grammatical sentences into account. This enhances the consistency of the process although this may result in including parts of sentences that are not fully dedicated to fiscal policy. If sentences could be classified in two (or more) categories, they were allocated to only one of the six categories for reasons of consistency and simplicity, following the prioritization rule: 6 > 5 > (4 & 3 & 2) > 1. In this statement, the sign ">" means "has priority over". No order rule was needed for categories 2, 3 and 4 as in practice there were no overlaps between these categories.
The final stage consisted in counting the number of words in each category and for each month in an automated manner. Automating of the counting process relied on specific symbols that the readers put into the text itself, and that the algorithm could recognise as delimiting and classifying the statements on fiscal policy. The algorithm used the PERL programming language.
In view of large variability in monthly numbers, quarterly averages were used, which were scaled by the total number of words used in the introductory statements/minutes.
